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This article examines the distributional burden of different price-point instant lottery games.  
Theoretical reasons exist for expecting higher-priced instant lottery games to be less regressive 
than lower-priced instant games.  Using county-level data on sales by price point for six states, 
the empirical results show that higher-priced instant games are less regressive than lower-priced 
games.  In addition, regressivity is rejected in favor of proportionality for some instant lottery 
games.  The analysis also reveals that counties having a higher-percentage of low-income 
households have higher sales of lower-priced instant games, but differences in the distribution of 
household income have no significant impact on higher-priced instant sales. Taken together, the 
findings suggest that large differences in the distributional burden of individual instant games are 
masked if aggregated instant-lottery sales data are used. 
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The Distributional Burden of Instant Lottery Ticket Expenditures:   
An Analysis by Price Point 
 
Introduction 
  Beginning with New Hampshire’s introduction of the first modern-day state lottery in 
1964, forty-three states and the District of Columbia now operate state-owned lotteries.  Average 
annual growth in lottery sales topped 5 percent in the 2000s and surpassed 10 percent during the 
1980s and the 1990s.  Lottery sales in the United States totaled $58 billion in fiscal year 2010, of 
which state governments retained (after prize payouts and administrative expenses) nearly $18 
billion (roughly 2 percent of total state tax revenue) for spending on education, infrastructure, 
and various social programs.
1  The growth of the lottery industry over the past several decades is 
not only a result of more states offering lotteries, but also ever-evolving and expanding product 
lines designed to attract and retain customers through higher jackpots. 
   The growth of the lottery industry has sparked much academic research on various 
aspects of the industry.  The issue garnering the most attention is the distribution of lottery ticket 
expenditures across different income groups; that is, which income groups spend a greater 
percentage of their income on lottery tickets.  This is commonly referred to as the distributional 
burden of lottery ticket expenditures (see, e.g., Clotfelter and Cook 1987, 1989; Scott and Garen, 
1994; Farrell et al., 1999; Price and Novak, 1999; Forrest et al., 2000; Garrett and Coughlin, 
2009).
2  Determining the distributional burden of state lotteries is most commonly done by 
estimating the income elasticity of demand for lottery tickets.  The majority of research has 
shown that state lotteries have an income elasticity of demand less than one, thus defining 
                                                 
1 Data are from the North American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries (www.naslp.org). The numbers for 
2010 suggest an average tax rate of 31 percent.  The average tax rate for lotteries has historically been much higher 
than that of other state excise taxes (Clotfelter and Cook, 1987).  Whether a lottery ticket constitutes a tax is a point 
of debate since lottery participation is strictly voluntary. 
2 This is only a small listing of the dozens of studies on the subject.   3 
 
expenditures on state lotteries as regressive.  Research has also shown that instant lottery games 
(also called “scratch-offs”) tend to be more regressive than online lottery games such as Lotto or 
Powerball (Mikesell, 1989; Oster, 2004), and that online games may be progressive.
3    
  Speculative reasons for the difference in the distributional burden of instant and online 
games stem from research on why people play lotteries and the fact that online games tend to 
have higher jackpots than instant games.  Caplin and Leahy (1998) suggest people play the 
lottery for fun, and that the level of fun is dependent on the size of the jackpot relative to a 
player’s current wealth.  Thus, wealthier individuals are more likely to play online games.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that players have a poor understanding of the odds of 
winning.  If true, then individuals with more income (and thus with more education) have a 
better understanding of the expected return of lottery games and will play online games with 
larger jackpots, as increasing jackpots due to rollovers raise the expected return to the player.
4     
  Although the evidence suggests that instant lottery games are more regressive than online 
lottery games, studies on the distributional burden of instant lottery games have treated all instant 
lottery games within a state as identical.  Before the the mid-1990s, all instant lottery games in a 
state (and across states as well) were very similar as they all cost $1 and had similar jackpot 
sizes. Since then, however, states have offered higher-priced instant lottery games in additional 
to the traditional $1 instant lottery game.  It is now commonplace for states to simultaneously 
offer for sale $2, $5, $10, $20 and even $30 or $50 instant lottery tickets that have jackpots of 
several million dollars.  These ticket prices are often referred to as price points by the lottery 
                                                 
3 Instant lottery games require a player to scratch a latex covering on the ticket to immediately find out if a prize is 
won.  Online lottery games require the player to select various combinations of numbers (say, 5 out of 49), or allow 
the lottery computer to select random numbers, at an authorized lottery retailer (gas station, convenience store, etc.).  
Drawings for online games are held several times a week and are aired on television, and the player wins if some or 
all of his or her numbers match those drawn.   
4 A rollover occurs when jackpots accumulate over several drawings because each previous drawing had no winner. 4 
 
industry since the price for each instant game does not change.  Although the jackpots available 
from instant games are lower than those from most online games, the potential jackpots available 
with higher-priced instant lottery games are significantly greater than the jackpots available with 
$1 instant lottery games.   
  Given that jackpot size is a reason cited for the different distributional burdens of instant 
games and online games, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the distributional burden of instant 
games varies by price point since the instant-game jackpot size is positively correlated with the 
ticket price.  Thus, higher-priced instant lottery games should be less regressive than lower-
priced instant lottery games, just as online games are less regressive than instant games.  The 
difference in regressivity between lower-priced and higher-priced instant lottery games may also 
be compounded by the large price differences in instant lottery tickets, as higher-priced instant 
games are more likely to attract wealthier players. 
  This paper provides estimates of the distributional burden of instant lottery games by 
price point, with the purpose of testing the hypothesis that the distributional burden of all instant 
lottery games are not the same – specifically, that higher-priced instant games are less regressive 
than lower-priced instant games.  In addition, this paper also explores the how the distribution of 
household income influences instant lottery sales.  Recent research by Ghent and Grant (2010) 
shows that regions which have a larger percentage of lower-income households have higher 
lottery sales.   The income elasticity analysis and the household-income distribution analysis 
each provides different insights into the distribution of lottery expenditures.  The analysis is 
conducted using county-level data on instant lottery game sales by price point for several U.S. 
states.     5 
 
  Understanding the distributional burden of different instant lottery games is important for 
several reasons.  First, the distributional burden of state lotteries has been the predominant area 
of academic research on the lottery industry for the past several decades, but no research to date 
has examined the distributional burden of different instant lottery games.  Second, online ticket 
sales have historically been a greater percentage of total lottery ticket sales (e.g., 71 percent in 
1992), but in recent years instant ticket sales have represented the majority of lottery tickets sold 
(51 percent in 2008).
5  The growth in instant ticket sales relative to online sales in the mid-1990s 
corresponds to the introduction of higher-priced instant lottery games.  Finally, the distributional 
burden of state lotteries has received critical attention given the revenue maximization objective 
of state lottery agencies and the moral opposition of some groups toward state-sponsored 
gambling.  As more states continue to adopt lotteries and other states expand lottery operations, 
the distributional burden of state lotteries will likely remain at the forefront of the policy debate 
over state lottery adoption and expansion. 
   
II. An Overview of Instant Games by Price Point 
  In the mid-1990s states began to offer higher-priced instant lottery tickets in addition to 
the traditional $1 instant lottery game.  The most common price points for these higher-priced 
instant games are $2, $5, $10, $15, $20, and $30.  Of the states with lotteries in 2008, all offered 
$2 and $5 instant tickets, 35 offered $10 tickets, and 29 offered $20 tickets.  The Texas Lottery 
currently offers the most expensive instant lottery ticket at a price of $50.  Higher-priced instant 
games contribute to the majority of instant-lottery game revenue.  For example, across all lottery 
states in 2008, revenue from $2 tickets was 22 percent ($6.6 billion) of total instant-ticket 
revenue; $10 and $15 tickets contributed 18 percent ($5.4 billion) of total instant-ticket revenue; 
                                                 
5 Ticket sales data are from Lafluer’s (2009). 6 
 
and $5 tickets accounted for 25 percent ($7.3 billion) of total instant-ticket revenue.
6  In 
comparison, revenues from the traditional $1 instant lottery game accounted for only 11 percent 
($3.1 billion) of total instant-lottery ticket revenue. 
  The sales of higher-priced instant tickets relative to $1 instant tickets are attributed to the 
higher jackpots and greater expected return available from these higher-priced games, as 
revealed in a legislative report written by the Wisconsin Lottery: 
“The Lottery has been able to generate increases in instant scratch sales in recent years 
by responding to consumer demands for higher price point tickets with higher top prizes, 
better overall odds of winning, and a higher payout.” 
7    
A search of state lottery websites reveals that $1 instant lottery games have top jackpots 
averaging from $50,000 to $100,000, whereas higher-priced instant games have jackpots of 
several million dollars.  At the time of this writing, for example, the Florida Lottery offers a $20 
instant game with a jackpot of $3 million; the Texas Lottery offers a $50 instant game with a top 
prize of $7.5 million; and the New York Lottery offers a $30 instant game with a jackpot of $1 
million a year for life.
8  Higher-priced instant lottery games also tend to have a greater expected 
return to the player (corresponding to a lower return to the state).  On average, $1 instant lottery 
games have an expected return to the player of about 50 to 55 percent, whereas higher-priced 
instant games have a return of about 60 to 70 percent.  Although state lottery agencies receive a 
                                                 
6 See Lafleur’s (2009, page 377). 
7 Wisconsin Department of Revenue, Lottery Division. “Lottery Sales and Prize Payout.”  A Report to the Joint 
Committee on Finance, 2011, page 6.  Available at 
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/jfc/passive_review/Documents/2011_02_28_DOR%20PR%20to%20JFC%20on%20L
ottery%20ticket%20sales(2.28.2011).pdf.  Garrett and Sobel (2004) show that lottery sales are higher for games 
having greater jackpots, higher expected returns, and lower odds of winning. 
8 The instant games are:  Florida – $3 Million Monopoly; Texas – Ultimate Casino Jackpot; New York – Win 
$1,000,000 a Year for Life.  The games listed here were available as of January 20, 2011.  Most instant games are on 
the market for several months. 7 
 
lower percentage return from each higher-priced instant game on average, the absolute dollar 
amount the lottery receives from a higher-priced instant game is greater than that from each $1 
game.
9 
    The primary objective of state lottery agencies is to generate profits from the sale of 
lottery tickets to fund various public social programs.
10  As such, the introduction and current 
availability of higher-priced instant games appears commensurate with this objective as state 
lottery agencies are generating greater revenues from higher-priced instant lottery tickets.  It is 
straightforward to demonstrate that lottery profits are higher when the state lottery offers instant 
lottery tickets with different price-points.  
  Consider a monopoly state lottery agency that sells only instant tickets at a single price 
point, say $1.  The lottery has revenue of P1(Q1)·Q1 and costs of C(Q1), where P1 = the price 
point of the lottery ticket and Q1 = the quantity of tickets sold.
11  The lottery will maximize 
profits of π = P1 (Q1)·Q1 – C(Q1).  Differentiating profits with respect to Q and rearranging terms 
yields  1 1  
 
       ,   which is the usual profit-maximizing condition for a monopolist.  With 
positive MC and P1, it must be the case that the price elasticity of demand, ε, is less than -1.  
Thus, the demand for $1 tickets is price elastic at the profit maximizing level of P1 and Q1. 
  Because the demand for $1 instant tickets is price elastic at the profit-maximizing price 
and level of output, a profit-maximizing state lottery cannot generate additional revenue by 
                                                 
9 For example, for each ticket sold, a $1 ticket with an expected return to the player of 50 percent yields 50 cents to 
the state, whereas a $2 ticket with an expected return to the player of 60 percent yields 80 cents to the state. 
10 The profit (or revenue) maximization objective of state lotteries is clearly stated in the annual reports of state 
lottery agencies and their web pages.  For example, the mission of the Florida Lottery is “…to maximize revenues in 
a manner consistent with the dignity of the state and the welfare of its citizens” 
(http://www.flalottery.com/inet/aboutus-factsMain.do).  The objective of the Kansas lottery is “… to produce the 
maximum amount of revenue possible for the State of Kansas while insuring the integrity of all games” 
(http://www.kslottery.com/LotteryInfo/AboutUs.htm). 
11 Here the analysis uses the dollar price of a lottery ticket rather than the expected price. Under the latter 
framework, the expected price of a ticket to the player would be the expected return of the ticket and marginal costs 
would be net of prize payouts.  The conclusions are the same regardless of which measure of price is used.  8 
 
increasing the price of $1 instant tickets.  Profits may be increased through more advertising (to 
increase Q), but this would be only a short-run solution since sales eventually plateau over time 
as games age (Mikesell, 1994).  To generate greater profits over the longer-run, the state lottery 
can segment the market for lottery tickets based on consumer income – high (low) income 
consumers are more (less) likely to buy higher-priced tickets – by introducing higher-priced 
instant lottery tickets in addition to still offering $1 tickets.  If the state lottery now offers N 
higher-priced instant lottery games in addition to $1 instant games, the lottery will maximize 
profits (Π) of  




Clearly, Π > π if the revenue from each game exceeds the cost of providing each game.  This 
condition makes intuitive sense, as it is unlikely that state lotteries would, at least in the long run, 
operate an individual lottery game at a loss.
12  Lottery profits will therefore be greater if the 
lottery offers multiple instant games at various price points than if it offered only $1 instant 
games.  
  In order to generate sales from higher-priced instant games, higher-priced instant tickets 
must have higher jackpots and expected returns since there would be no incentive for players to 
buy higher-priced tickets if these tickets have the same sized jackpots and expected returns as $1 
tickets.  Not only are higher-priced tickets simply more affordable to higher-income players, 
research by Caplin and Leahy (1998) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggests that higher-
income individuals are more likely to play lottery games with larger jackpots, such as those 
                                                 
12 In the short run it is possible for revenue from any game n to be less than the costs of producing game n (i.e., in 
the short run an instant lottery game may still be produced as long as price exceeds average variable costs).  Losses 
on any game could be a result of substitution between games (Clotfelter and Cook, 1989) or a mistaken estimation 
of consumer demand by the state lottery agency.   9 
 
offered by higher-priced instant games.  Thus, the greater affordability of higher-priced tickets 
by higher-income individuals and the preference of these individuals for larger jackpots suggest 
that higher-priced instant tickets may be less regressive than lower-priced instant tickets.   
 
III. The Distributional Burden of Instant Lottery Expenditures   
  To determine the distributional burden of state lotteries, the majority of research on the 
subject has estimated the income elasticity of demand for lottery tickets by regressing lottery 
sales on income and a set of economic and demographic characteristics.
13  Although individual-
level data is preferred, there are few available surveys of lottery players.  Surveys that have been 
used in previous studies do not include player expenditures on individual lottery games and/or 
continuous measures of player income (i.e., only income ranges), both of which are required 
here.  As a result, the unit of observation in most studies has typically been a zip code, a county, 
or a state.
14  Due to the use of aggregated data, any income elasticity estimated from aggregate 
data cannot be interpreted the same as an individual’s income elasticity of demand unless all 
agents are homogeneous.  Therefore, the estimated income elasticities here (as in previous 
studies using aggregated data) are interpreted as a measure of the responsiveness of regional per 
capita sales with respect to changes in regional per capita income, and thus provide a picture of 
the distributional burden across county income rather than across individual income.   
  Studies on the distributional burden of instant games (in aggregate) have generally found 
income elasticities less than one, although estimates do vary.  In an analysis of Illinois counties 
                                                 
13 Although parametric estimation has been used most commonly to determine the distributional burden of lotteries, 
several studies have used the Suits Index (Suits, 1977), which measures the relative sizes of cumulative tax burdens 
and cumulative incomes (see Clotfelter and Cook, 1989; Price and Novak, 1999; Combs, Kim, and Spry, 2008; and 
Ghent and Grant, 2010).   
14 Clotfelter and Cook (1987), Scott and Garen (1994), and Perez and Humphreys (2011) use household survey data 
on lottery expenditures.   10 
 
for several years in the 1980s, Mikesell (1989) finds an income elasticity of demand for instant 
tickets of about 0.95.  Garrett and Coughlin (2009) use county-level data for several states and 
obtain income elasticity estimates for instant games that range from 0.20 to 0.70.  Other studies 
obtain much smaller income elasticity estimates.  For example, Price and Novak (1999, 2000) 
find income elasticities of -0.20 to -0.45 for instant lottery tickets in Texas, thus suggesting 
instant tickets are inferior goods.  A similar result was found by Hansen (1995) in a county-level 
analysis of Colorado instant games.  Despite the wide range of estimates across studies, each has 
found that instant lottery games are regressive.  These studies, however, used aggregate instant-
lottery ticket sales in their analysis, thus ignoring potential differences in the distributional 
burden of instant lottery tickets with different price points. 
  To test the hypothesis that the regressivity of higher-priced instant games is less than that 
of lower-priced instant games, the analysis here uses county-level data for the states of Florida, 
Iowa, Missouri, New York, Texas, and West Virginia for 2009.
15  Instant lottery sales by price 
point at the county-level were obtained by contacting each state lottery agency.  In 2009, the six 
states offered $1, $2, $5, and $10 instant lottery games.  In addition, $3 tickets were available in 
four states (not New York and Texas), $20 tickets were available in five states (not West 
Virginia), and $30 tickets were available in two states (Florida and New York).
16  Descriptive 
statistics for instant lottery price-point sales are shown in Table 1.  As seen in this table, sales of 
$1 instant tickets accounted for 7 percent to 24 percent of total instant sales (depending on the 
state) in 2009, whereas sales of $2, $3, $5, and $10 tickets each contributed a larger share of total 
                                                 
15 Several factors simultaneously determined the level of data aggregation and the states used in the analysis.  First, 
county-level data were the smallest unit of aggregation for which instant-ticket price point sales were available for 
several states.  Second, all states that had a lottery in 2009 and a minimum of 50 counties (to ensure an adequate 
number of cross-sectional units) were contacted, but many states did not have instant-ticket price-point data readily 
available at the county level.  Finally, it was desired to have states from different regions of the country to ensure 
that the results were representative of all states as closely as possible. 
16 In 2009, the Texas Lottery also offered $7, $25, and $50 tickets.  However, these price points were excluded from 
the analysis because county-level sales data for these price points were incomplete. 11 
 
instant-game sales. Not surprisingly, per capita sales for these price points were generally higher 
than sales for $1 instant games. 
[Table 1] 
  The correlation analysis in Table 2 provides preliminary insight into the relationship 
between per capita instant lottery sales by price point and per capita county income.  The 
correlation between county income and $1 instant ticket sales is shown in column (1), and the 
correlation between county income and sales for the highest-priced instant game in the state is 
shown in column (2).  As seen in the table, the correlation between per capita income and per 
capita sales differs significantly by instant-game price point.  For each of the six states, the 
correlation between income and $1 ticket sales is less than the correlation between income and 
higher-priced instant ticket sales.  In many instances, the correlation between $1 ticket sales and 
income is negative, whereas the correlation between higher-priced sales and income is positive.  
The difference between these correlations is statistically significant for all states except Missouri 
and West Virginia (column 3).  The correlations shown in Table 2 generally reveal a larger 
positive (or less negative) correlation between higher-priced instant ticket sales and income. 
[Table 2] 
   Since the primary objective here is to explore the distributional burden of different instant 
lottery games, it is necessary to estimate income elasticities of lottery demand.  To do so, the 
following lottery demand equation is estimated for each instant lottery game in each state: 
      l n ( Salesi) = β·ln(Incomei) + Xi + εi ,                                  (1) 
where Salesi is per capita instant lottery sales (by price point) in county i  and Incomei is per 
capita personal income in county i.  Both Salesi and Incomei are transformed into natural 
logarithms.  An instant lottery game is regressive (progressive) if the estimated income elasticity 12 
 
(β) from equation (1) is less (greater) than one.  The lottery is considered proportional if the 
income elasticity is equal to one.    
 The  matrix  X contains demographic variables that previous studies have identified as 
significant determinants of lottery sales.  Specifically, the instant-lottery demand model includes 
population density, the percentage of the population with a bachelor’s degree or higher, the 
percentage of the population 65 years of age or older, and a binary indicator variable for whether 
the county borders another state.
17  Past research has shown that lottery sales are (1) higher in 
more densely populated areas, (2) inversely related to education levels, and (3) different across 
age groups.
18  The effect of cross-border lottery shopping has been shown to influence lottery 
sales in border counties (Garrett and Marsh, 2002; Tosun and Skidmore, 2004).
19 
  The income elasticity in equation (1) is based on a measure of average (per capita) 
income in each county and thus does not capture the distribution of income within each county, 
which has also been found to be an important determinant of lottery sales (Rubenstein and 
Scafidi, 2002; Ghent and Grant, 2010).  Matrix X therefore also includes variables to capture the 
distribution of household income in each county.  These variables include: the percentage of 
county households having income less than $15,000 (lower income); the percentage of county 
households having income between $15,000 and $35,000 (lower-middle income); and the 
percentage of county households having income between $35,000 and $50,000 (upper-middle 
                                                 
17 All data were obtained from the U.S. Census. 
18 Studies have considered other economic and demographic variables as well, including the unemployment rate and 
the percent of the population living below the poverty level.  A confounding issue in modeling lottery demand is that 
many of these variables tend to be highly correlated with each other as well as income and education.  We include 
only income and education since these two variables have tended to be the strongest predictors of lottery sales in the 
literature. 
19 The expected return of lottery games has also been shown to be a determinant of lottery sales (Garrett and Sobel, 
2004; Brown and Rork, 2005).  Because separate regressions for each state are estimated here, there is no variation 
in the expected return as the expected return faced by all counties in a state is the same.   13 
 
income).
20  The omitted category is the percentage of county households having income greater 
than $50,000 (upper income).   
  The income elasticity generated from per capita income and the household-income 
distribution variables each provides different insights into the distribution of lottery expenditures.  
The household-income distribution variables capture different levels of instant-lottery ticket 
expenditures by households having different incomes, but they say nothing about spending as a 
percentage of income.  The income elasticity, on the other hand, reflects how instant-ticket sales 
respond to changes in income.  Put another way, the income elasticity reflects how instant-ticket 
sales change with respect to a change income holding the distribution of income in each county 
constant.   Ghent and Grant (2010) find that counties in South Carolina having a larger 
percentage of lower-middle income households have lower lottery sales per capita, and counties 
having a larger percentage of upper-middle income households have higher sales per capita.  
Rubenstein and Scafidi (2002) find no significant difference in ticket sales across household 
income in Georgia.  Based on the earlier discussion, a reasonable hypothesis is that counties 
having a greater percentage of high-income households may have higher sales of higher-priced 
instant tickets.    
 
IV. Empirical Results 
  Equation (1) is estimated for each instant-ticket price point in each state (see Table 1) to 
obtain game-specific income elasticities of demand.  Equation (1) is also estimated using pooled 
data for the six states.  The income elasticity of demand for all instant games (the sum of game-
specific sales) in each state is obtained to highlight differences in the game-specific income 
elasticities and the overall instant-game income elasticity.  In addition to presenting the estimated 
                                                 
20 From the U.S. Census. 14 
 
income elasticities, the coefficients on the income distribution variables are also presented since 
these variables provide information on how lottery expenditures vary by the distribution of 
household income within counties. 
 
Results – The Distribution of Household Income 
  The coefficients for each of the three household income variables for each instant-game 
price point in each state are shown in Table 3.  For brevity, the coefficient estimates for the other 
independent variables included in X are provided in the Appendix. 
[Table 3] 
  The results in Table 3 suggest no clear pattern of how the distribution of household 
income impacts lottery sales.  This is true within states and across instant games, as well as 
across states.  In Florida, for example, instant ticket sales are higher in counties having a higher 
percentage of low-income and lower-middle income households (relative to upper-income 
households), but in New York a greater percentage of low-income households is associated with 
less sales relative to upper-income households.  In three states (Iowa, Missouri, and West 
Virginia), the results generally suggest no significant differences in instant lottery sales across 
the income distribution. 
  Given the heterogeneous results from the state-specific regressions, the results from the 
pooled-state regressions can provide a somewhat clearer picture of the impact of the income 
distribution on instant ticket sales.
21   For lower-priced instant tickets (≤ $5), per capita sales of 
these tickets are higher in counties having a greater percentage of low-income and lower-middle 
income households.  On the other hand, for higher-priced instant tickets (> $5), lottery sales are 
generally not statistically different for both lower-income and lower-middle income households   
                                                 
21 The pooled regressions include state dummy variables. 15 
 
relative to upper-income households.  In the case of $20 instant tickets, a greater percentage of 
lower-income households is associated with lower $20 lottery sales relative to upper-income 
households.  Thus, although a clear relationship between the distribution of household income 
and instant lottery sales has not been found, there is evidence that the impact of the income 
distribution on instant lottery sales does vary by instant price point, a fact that is missed when 
only aggregate instant lottery sales is examined. 
 
Results – Income Elasticities of Demand by Price Point   
  The income elasticity of demand for each instant game price point in each state is shown 
in Table 4.  The full regression results are shown in the Appendix. 
[Table 4] 
  The empirical results in Table 4 support the hypothesis that higher-priced instant games 
have larger income elasticities than lower-priced instant games and thus are less regressive than 
lower-priced games.  For each state, the estimated income elasticities of demand generally 
increase in magnitude with instant game price point, although most income elasticity estimates 
are not significantly different than zero for the states of Iowa, Missouri and West Virginia (but 
still indicate regressivity since β < 1).  For the other states, the income elasticities for higher-
priced instant games are, with a few exceptions, statistically larger than the income elasticity 
estimates for the lower-priced instant games.  Similar results are found from the pooled 
regressions.
22  Although it is not possible to test the equality of income elasticity estimates across 
instant games (since they are each from a different regression), there is evidence that higher-
priced instant games are less regressive than lower- priced games since the former are 
statistically greater than zero and have larger income elasticity estimates.  The estimated income 
                                                 
22 The pooled regressions include state dummy variables. 16 
 
elasticities from Table 4 are shown in Figure 1 to illustrate that the regressivity of instant lottery 
tickets generally decreases as the ticket price increases. 
[Figure 1] 
  One interesting finding is that the income elasticities of demand for $10 and $20 instant 
tickets in Texas and $5 and $10 tickets in West Virginia are considerably larger than the income 
elasticities for all other instant games.  For these games, t-tests indicate that the null hypothesis 
that each income elasticity is equal to one cannot be rejected.  Thus, the distributional burden of 
these higher-priced instant games (shown in italics in Table 4) may be proportional.  Although 
online games have been shown to be proportional or progressive in some instances (Mikesell, 
1989; Oster, 2004; Garrett and Coughlin, 2009; Perez and Humphreys, 2011), the results 
presented here reveal that higher-priced instant games may, to some degree, mimic online games 
in terms of their income elasticity of demand.  This seems reasonable, as higher-priced instant 
games have jackpots and odds of winning that are more similar to online games than are the 
jackpots and odds of winning from lower-priced instant games.  The important conclusion is that 
not all instant lottery games may be regressive.    
  The results shown in the last column of Table 4 and the far-right bar in each graph in 
Figure 1 reveal that the income elasticities for all instant games combined (which are similar to 
those found in previous studies) are quite different than the income elasticities from individual 
instant games.  For example, the income elasticity for all instant games in Texas is 0.471, but 
individual instant-game elasticities range from 0.249 to 0.801.  A similar result is found for New 
York and Florida.  In addition, while the income elasticities for all instant games in both Iowa 
and Missouri are both not significantly different than zero, the income elasticity for $2 tickets in 
Iowa and the income elasticity for $3 tickets in Missouri are much larger and statistically 17 
 
different than zero.  Thus, while regressivity is found for most instant games and for all instant 
games combined, the degree of regressivity varies across instant games, and in some cases, the 
income elasticity for aggregated instant games masks the proportional distributional burden of 
some higher-priced instant games.
23 
 
Results – A Comparison with Online Games 
  It is worthwhile to now briefly explore how the income elasticities of demand for higher-
priced instant games compare with the income elasticity of demand for online games (in 
aggregate).  Since online lottery games have much higher jackpots than the highest-priced instant 
lottery games, it is expected that the income elasticity of demand for online tickets is greater than 
that for instant games.   
  Equation (1) was re-estimated for each state and the pooled sample of states using per 
capita online lottery sales as the dependent variable.  The estimated income elasticities for online 
games are shown in the last column of Table 5.  To provide a comparison with the instant game 
elasticities, the largest instant price point income elasticity and the aggregate instant game 
elasticity (both from Table 3) are shown in the first two columns of Table 5. 
[Table 5] 
  The results in Table 5   show that the income elasticity for online games is generally 
higher than that of each instant game price point, but there are some exceptions.  For example, in 
Texas the income elasticity of demand for $20 instant tickets is greater than that for online 
                                                 
23 An alternative method of examining the distributional burden of lotteries is the Suits Index (Suits, 1977).  The 
Index, which ranges from -1 to +1, measures the relative sizes of cumulative lottery expenditures and cumulative 
incomes.  A values less than (greater than) zero indicates regressivity (progressivity).  Calculated indexes for each 
instant lottery game suggest regressivity, and in some states higher-priced instant games are less regressive than 
lower-priced instant games.  The Suits Indexes are available upon request.  The main reason regression is the 
preferred method of analysis over the Suits Index is that regression analysis controls for other factors that influence 
lottery sales (included in matrix X in equation 1) in addition to income, whereas the Suits Index only makes use of 
lottery sales and income.   18 
 
games.  The same is true for $3 tickets in Missouri.  Also, $10 and $20 instant games from the 
pooled sample of states have income elasticities (0.687 and 0.694, respectively) greater than the 
income elasticity for online lottery games (0.578).  Generally, the results show that online games 
are less regressive than instant lottery games, a finding supported by earlier literature.  But the 
analysis by instant game price point done here suggests the possibility that some higher-priced 
instant games may be less regressive than online games.    
 
V. Conclusion 
  The distributional burden of state lotteries has been, and most likely will continue to be, 
the most important issue in the policy discussion of state lottery adoption and expansion.  To 
date, studies on the distributional burden of lotteries have examined the two broad categories of 
lottery games – instant games and online games.  Research has generally found that instant 
lottery games are more regressive than online games, with the common explanation that higher-
income players are more attracted to online games’ higher jackpots.  Following similar logic, it 
was argued here that the distributional burden of individual instant lottery games should differ 
for a similar reason – namely, higher-income players are more likely to play higher-priced instant 
lottery games with larger jackpots.  Thus, the regressivity of higher-priced instant games should 
be less than that of lower-priced instant games. 
  The results revealed that the income elasticities of demand for higher-priced instant 
tickets are generally greater than those of lower-priced instant tickets, thus supporting the 
hypothesis that higher-priced tickets are less regressive than lower-priced tickets.  Most higher-
priced instant tickets, despite being less regressive than lower-priced instant tickets, are more 
regressive than online games.  Evidence was also provided that the distributional burden for 19 
 
several higher-priced instant games was not significantly different than proportionality.  This 
finding suggests that not all instant lottery games may be regressive.  In addition, the distribution 
of household income provided mixed results across instant games and states, but the pooled 
analysis suggested that counties having a higher percentage of lower-income households have 
greater sales of lower-priced instant games, whereas the level of higher-priced instant game sales 
was not significantly different for lower-income households relative to upper-income 
households.   
  The income elasticity estimates for each instant game price point were also found to be 
quite different than the income elasticity of aggregated instant sales.  The difference between 
aggregate instant game elasticities and those for individual games further reveals that using 
aggregated instant game sales may mask large differences in the distributional burden of 
individual instant games.  Any policy discussion on the distributional burden of instant lotteries 
games therefore benefits from a game-level analysis rather than a more aggregate analysis since 
the latter, as shown here, can mask large differences in the distributional burden of instant 
games.   Future research would benefit from the use of individual-level data on instant game 
expenditures by price point to explore whether individuals’ income elasticities are similar to the 
more aggregate income elasticities used here.   APPENDIX TABLES 
 
Table A1: Florida – Full Regression Results 
  Dependent Variable – Per Capita Sales (ln) of: 
Variable  $1 Tickets  $2 Tickets  $3 Tickets  $5 Tickets  $10 Tickets  $20 Tickets  $30 Tickets  All Instant 
Tickets 

































































































































































2  0.652 0.572 0.353 0.476  0.450  0.245  0.171  0.439 
Notes: Absolute t-statistics in parentheses based on White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% or better.  N = 
67 counties. 21 
 
Table A2: Iowa – Full Regression Results 
  Dependent Variable – Per Capita Sales (ln) of: 
Variable  $1 Tickets  $2 Tickets  $3 Tickets  $5 Tickets  $10 Tickets  $20 Tickets  $30 Tickets  All Instant 
Tickets 











(0.72)  -------  -1.190 
(0.28) 











(0.87)  -------  0.529 
(1.32) 











(0.58)  -------  0.022 
(1.34) 











(1.07)  -------  0.023 
(1.45) 











(2.46)  -------  -0.036* 
(1.85) 











(0.29)  -------  -0.000* 
(1.86) 











(2.19)  -------  -0.244** 
(3.38) 











(1.26)  -------  -0.027** 
(4.06) 











(0.67)  -------  -0.005 
(0.29) 











(0.83)  -------  0.067** 
(2.73) 
Adjusted R
2  0.239 0.291 0.192 0.232  0.222  0.084  -------  0.246 





Table A3: Missouri – Full Regression Results 
  Dependent Variable – Per Capita Sales (ln) of: 
Variable  $1 Tickets  $2 Tickets  $3 Tickets  $5 Tickets  $10 Tickets  $20 Tickets  $30 Tickets  All Instant 
Tickets 











(0.16)  -------  -0.604 
(0.14) 











(0.49)  -------  0.422 
(1.07) 











(0.34)  -------  0.008 
(0.60) 











(1.80)  -------  0.024** 
(2.00) 











(0.60)  -------  0.012 
(0.70) 











(3.24)  -------  0.001** 
(2.61) 











(0.92)  -------  0.118* 
(1.76) 











(0.95)  -------  -0.017** 
(2.56) 











(0.20)  -------  -0.009 
(0.62) 











(0.79)  -------  0.010 
(1.10) 
Adjusted R
2  0.343 0.239 0.158 0.158  0.157  0.088  -------  0.199 





Table A4: New York – Full Regression Results 
  Dependent Variable – Per Capita Sales (ln) of: 
Variable  $1 Tickets  $2 Tickets  $3 Tickets  $5 Tickets  $10 Tickets  $20 Tickets  $30 Tickets  All Instant 
Tickets 
Constant  -2.797* 
(2.00) 
-1.991 










Per Capita Income (ln)  0.504** 
(3.79) 
0.527** 










% Low Income  0.008 
(0.84) 
0.014 










% Low-Middle Income  0.047** 
(3.85) 
0.045** 










% Middle Income  -0.035* 
(1.97) 
-0.047** 










Area  4.06e-5 
(0.94) 
7.49e-5 










Border Dummy  -0.025 
(0.71) 
-0.025 










% Bachelor’s Degree  -0.011** 
(3.00) 
-0.013** 










% Pop > 65  0.012 
(1.01) 
0.019* 










% Black Pop  0.005 
(1.28) 
-0.001 











2 0.535  0.511  -------  0.284  0.461  0.445  0.560  0.288 





Table A5: Texas – Full Regression Results 
  Dependent Variable – Per Capita Sales (ln) of: 
Variable  $1 Tickets  $2 Tickets  $3 Tickets  $5 Tickets  $10 Tickets  $20 Tickets  $30 Tickets  All Instant 
Tickets 











(2.46)  -------  -0.227 
(0.15) 











(3.62)  -------  0.471** 
(3.23) 











(2.56)  -------  0.007 
(1.07) 











(0.66)  -------  0.003 
(0.53) 











(2.12)  -------  0.022** 
(2.41) 











(0.21)  -------  6.36e-5 
(1.50) 











(2.86)  -------  -0.246** 
(4.63) 











(4.24)  -------  -0.028** 
(6.57) 











(2.88)  -------  0.016** 
(2.64) 











(2.47)  -------  0.002 
(0.57) 
Adjusted R
2  0.379 0.347 0.325 0.316  0.282  0.272  -------  0.310 





Table A6: West Virginia – Full Regression Results 
  Dependent Variable –  Per Capita Sales (ln) of: 
Variable  $1 Tickets  $2 Tickets  $3 Tickets  $5 Tickets  $10 Tickets  $20 Tickets  $30 Tickets  All Instant 
Tickets 
Constant  -1.135 
(0.31) 
-0.946 
(0.15)  -------  -6.958 
(1.29) 
-11.556 
(1.33)  ------- ------- -1.408 
(0.27) 
Per Capita Income (ln)  0.308 
(0.88) 
0.382 
(0.64)  -------  0.865 
(1.64) 
1.270 
(1.52)  ------- ------- 0.492 
(0.99) 
% Low Income  0.009 
(1.15) 
0.015 
(1.09)  -------  0.019 
(1.50) 
0.019 
(0.95)  ------- ------- 0.014 
(1.24) 
% Low-Middle Income  -0.009 
(0.68) 
-0.013 
(0.93)  -------  -0.014 
(0.76) 
-0.010 
(0.62)  ------- ------- -0.012 
(0.93) 
% Middle Income  -0.006 
(0.36) 
-0.013 
(0.71)  -------  0.016 
(0.50) 
0.016 
(0.50)  ------- ------- -0.005 
(0.28) 
Area  0.001** 
(2.59) 
0.001** 
(5.85)  -------  0.001** 
(3.08) 
0.001** 
(3.35)  ------- -------  0.001** 
(4.58) 
Border Dummy  -0.212** 
(2.99) 
-0.171* 
(1.97)  -------  -0.243** 
(2.46) 
-0.364** 
(3.48)  ------- -------  -0.218** 
(2.79) 
% Bachelor’s Degree  -0.004 
(0.36) 
-0.011 
(0.91)  -------  -0.015 
(1.16) 
-0.017 
(1.05)  ------- ------- -0.010 
(0.89) 
% Pop > 65  0.040 
(1.61) 
0.024 
(1.06)  -------  0.003 
(0.07) 
0.006 
(0.16)  ------- ------- 0.026 
(1.06) 
% Black Pop  0.031** 
(3.04) 
0.013 
(1.15)  -------  0.023 
(1.47) 
-0.002 
(0.15)  ------- ------- 0.017 
(1.59) 
Adjusted R
2 0.277  0.422  -------  0.257  0.293  -------  -------  0.391 





Table A7: Pooled States – Full Regression Results 
  Dependent Variable – Per Capita Sales (ln) of: 
Variable  $1 Tickets  $2 Tickets  $3 Tickets  $5 Tickets  $10 Tickets  $20 Tickets  $30 Tickets  All Instant 
Tickets 

































































































































































2  0.614 0.715 0.665 0.815  0.612  0.764  0.323  0.687 
Notes: Absolute t-statistics in parentheses based on White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% or better.  N = 
647 counties.  Regressions also include state dummy variables, coefficients not shown. References 
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  Table 1:   Descriptive Statistics – Instant Lottery Games by Price Point  




Mean - Sales Per Capita  
Percent of Total Sales 
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Notes:  The mean is the county average for each state.  Totals may not sum to 100 due to rounding.  All data are for 2009.  See text for further data description.  N/A = no tickets 
sold at the respective price point. “Number of Games” is the number of instant-games at each price point that were available for sale during 2009. 30 
 
Table 2:  Correlations Between County Income and County Instant Lottery Sales 
 
  ρ1 (Income, $1 Sales)  ρ2 (Income, Top Sales)  T-test on Ho: ρ1 = ρ2 
Florida -0.373**  -0.090  3.07 
      
Iowa -0.123  0.093  2.12 
      
Missouri -0.237**  -0.155*  1.22 
      
New York  -0.116  0.575**  4.49 
      
Texas -0.234**  0.207**  8.25 
      
West Virginia  0.097  0.134  0.35 
Notes:  * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent or better from testing Ho: ρi = 0.  ‘Top Sales’ is sales for the highest-
priced instant lottery game in the state (see Table 1). 
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Table 3:  The Distribution of Household Income and Instant Lottery Sales, by Price Point 
    Coefficient Estimates 
State  Household Income 



















































































































































































Notes:  The dependent variable is the natural log of per capita instant-lottery ticket sales.  The coefficients reflect the percentage change in per capita sales from a percentage point 
change in the respective income distribution.  Variable definitions – Lower Income: percent of county households with income < $15,000; Lower Middle Income: percent of 
county households with income between $15,000 and $35,000; Upper Middle Income: percent of county households with income between $35,000 and $50,000.  Omitted category 
is percent of county households with income > $50,000.  *  denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% or better.  Full regression results are shown in the Appendix tables. 
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Table 4:  Instant-Lottery Income Elasticities by Price Point 
  Dependent Variable – Log Per Capita Sales of: 
State  $1 Tickets  $2 Tickets  $3 Tickets  $5 Tickets  $10 Tickets  $20 Tickets  $30 Tickets  All Instant 
Tickets 











































(0.50)  -------  0.422 
(1.07) 
New York  0.504** 
(3.79) 
0.527** 





















(3.62)  -------  0.471** 
(3.22) 
West Virginia  0.301 
(0.87) 
0.382 
(0.63)  -------  0.864 
(1.64) 
1.269 
(1.51)  ------- ------- 0.492 
(0.99) 
















Notes:  Each income elasticity estimate is obtained by estimating equation (1) for each instant game in each state.  * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent or better.  
Absolute t-statistics for Ho: β=0 are in parentheses and are based on White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  Coefficients in italics are not significantly different than 
one based on a t-test for Ho: β=1.  Full regression results are shown in the Appendix tables.  The pooled regressions also include state dummy variables.   
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Table 5:  Instant and Online Lottery Games - Income Elasticities 
State  Highest Instant Price Point 
Income Elasticity (Table 4) 
All Instant Games 
Income Elasticity (Table 4) 
All Online Games: 
Income Elasticity 










































Notes: Data in the first two columns are from Table 4.  * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent or better.  Absolute t-
statistics are in parentheses and are based on White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  All regressions also include a 
constant term and demographic variables, and the pooled regression also includes state dummy variables.   
  34 
 
Figure 1 – Instant Ticket Income Elasticities by Price Point 
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Pooled